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We study a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a buyer seeks to
procure an item from a single seller in multiple periods. The seller is privately
informed about her procurement cost at each period, and this cost may be serially
correlated over time. We restrict the buyer to use mechanisms satisfying a limited
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1 Introduction
We study a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a buyer seeks to procure an
item from a single seller in two periods. The seller’s procurement cost is continuously
distributed at each period, and is her private information. We allow the seller’s costs to
be serially correlated over time, and assume that the buyer has full commitment power.
The novel feature of our analysis is that we restrict the buyer to use mechanisms
that give non-negative flow payoffs to the seller at each period. Such limited liabil-
ity constraints are highly relevant in procurement settings, where firms may be cash
constrained and face imperfect credit markets. Our analysis highlights the dynamic dis-
tortions that these constraints generate, as well as their implications in terms of payoffs
and the frequency with which the principal and the agent contract.
Consider first the classic setting with no limited liability constraints. Under the
optimal mechanism, the buyer can pay the seller a low fixed amount in the first period,
and a high price in the second period.1 In such scheme, a seller with a high cost
realization in the first period obtains negative flow profits, but is willing to accept the
contract because she expects to earn high profits in the second period. As in Baron and
Besanko (1984) and Eső and Szentes (2017), under the optimal mechanism the seller only
gets informational rents for her first-period private information. Moreover, the dynamic
nature of the problem is “irrelevant” in the sense of Eső and Szentes (2017): under the
optimal contract the buyer obtains the same expected profits she would obtain if she
could observe and contract on the seller’s (orthogonalized) second period cost.
The mechanism described above, which gives negative flow payoff in the first period
to sellers with high costs, is not feasible in the presence of limited liability constraints.
Instead, the optimal mechanism takes the following form. A seller with a low cost in the
first period gets the same payments and allocation across all periods as in the optimal
mechanism without limited liability constraints. In contrast, a seller with a high cost
in the first period gets zero flow profits at the initial date: the payment she receives
exactly covers her procurement cost. To incentivize sellers with low cost realizations to
truthfully report in the first period, the optimal mechanism adjusts the payment and
probability of contracting in the second period as a function of the first period report.
1The timing of payments in the optimal mechanism is not unique. The payment scheme we discuss
here best highlight the constraint imposed by limited liabilities, but the insights of our analysis would
carry over to any other optimal payment schemes.
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In particular, firms that report a lower cost in the first period get a higher compensation
in the second period, and procure with higher probability.
Limited liability constraints give rise to the following implications. First, these con-
straints generate new distortions and inefficiencies. Indeed, the probability with which
the seller procures in the second period is lower and this decreases social surplus. The
buyer is always worse-off relative to the benchmark setting without limited liability
constraints. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that whether the seller is worse-off or not
depends on the correlation between her first period and second period cost. When costs
are independently distributed over time, the seller obtains the same expected payoff
with limited liability constraints than without these constraints. Instead, if costs are
positively serially correlated, limited liability constraints make the seller worse-off.
Second, the optimal contract under limited liability constraints displays a form of
path dependence: sellers that performed well in the first period (i.e., sellers with a low
cost realization) are given a preferential treatment in the second period. This result holds
regardless of the correlation structure of costs across periods and, in particular, also if
costs are independent. This resonates with practices of several firms. For instance,
Toyota has been known for favoring suppliers which had performed well in the past
(Roberts, 2007).
Third, our results show that the dynamic irrelevance result in Eső and Szentes (2017)
no longer holds when the principal is restricted to offer mechanisms satisfying limited
liability constraints: the principal obtains lower payoffs relative to the case in which she
can observe and contract on the agent’s “orthogonalized” second period cost. Intuitively,
under the optimal contract with limited liability, the contractual terms in the second
period must be distorted to provide incentives for truthful reporting in the first period.
Related literature. Our paper is primarily related to the large and growing literature
on dynamic mechanism design (Courty and Hao, 2000, Battaglini, 2005, Eső and Szentes,
2007, Pavan et al., 2014, Garrett and Pavan, 2012, Battaglini and Lamba, 2015 and
Board and Skrzypacz, 2016). We add to this literature by studying the effects that
limited liability constraints have on dynamic contracts.
Recent work by Krishna et al. (2013), Krähmer and Strausz (2015), Krasikov and
Lamba (2016), Ashlagi et al. (2016), and Bergemann et al. (2017) also study dynamic
environments with limited liability constraints. Krähmer and Strausz (2015) and Berge-
mann et al. (2017) study dynamic screening problems in the presence of ex-post partici-
pation constraints. They characterize optimal sales contracts when buyers can withdraw
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from the contract if their realized utility falls below zero. Krishna et al. (2013) and
Krasikov and Lamba (2016) study a contracting environment in which the agent’s pri-
vate information can take two values: Krishna et al. (2013) consider i.i.d. types, while
Krasikov and Lamba (2016) allow for serially correlated types. Ashlagi et al. (2016)
consider a model in which the agent’s type is continuously distributed and is drawn
i.i.d. over time. Our model allows the agent’s private information to be continuously
distributed and serially correlated. Moreover, we provide an explicit characterization of
the optimal contract, and discuss several of its economic implications. Lastly, our proof
techniques are broadly different from those used in these other papers.
Finally, Board (2011) shows that the practices that firms like Toyota use of favoring
suppliers who have performed well in the past can be rationalized with relational incen-
tives. Our arguments provide an alternative rationalization to such practices based on
limited liability constraints.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our framework. Section 3 charac-
terizes the optimal contract in the presence of limited liability constraints, and compares
it to the optimal contract without such constraints. Section 4 discusses the key economic
implications of our model. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a buyer who wants a seller to perform a job in two subsequent periods,
t = 1, 2. The buyer gets a value v > 0 for each period in which the job is done and 0
otherwise.
The seller incurs a cost whenever she performs the job. This cost is the seller’s
private information and changes over time. In particular, the cost the seller incurs from
performing the job in period t = 1, 2 is random and equal to θt. Cost θ1 is distributed
according to cdf F1(·), with support [θ, θ] and density f1(·) satisfying f1(θ) > 0 for
all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Similarly, given first period cost realization θ1, cost θ2 is distributed
according to F2(· | θ1) with support [θ, θ] and density f2(·|θ1) satisfying f2(θ | θ1) > 0




are bounded for all θ1, θ2 ∈ [θ, θ]2. We make the following assumptions on the cost
distributions.2
2Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee that the allocation that maximizes pointwise the principal’s payoffs
is monotone, and hence incentive compatible. Assumption 3 guarantees that, in the absence of limited
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Assumption 1. F1(θ)/f1(θ) is increasing in θ, and F2(θ | θ1)/f2(θ | θ1) is increasing
in θ for all θ1.
Assumption 2. θ2 − ∂F2(θ2|θ1)∂θ1
α
f1(θ1)f2(θ2|θ1) is increasing in θ2 for all θ1 and for all α ∈
[−1, 1].
Assumption 3. v − θ − F1(θ)/f1(θ) ≥ 0 and ∀θ1, θ2, v ≥ θ2 − ∂F2(θ2|θ1)∂θ1
F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)f2(θ2|θ1) .
Assumption 4. ∂F2(θ2 | θ1)/∂θ1 ≤ 0. Thus, if θ1 > θ′1, then F (θ2 | θ1) first-order
stochastically dominates F (θ2 | θ′1).
In order to procure the job, the buyer offers a mechanism to the seller. The mecha-
nism is represented by (i) a set of messages Mt the seller can send in period t = 1, 2, (ii)
a profile of allocation rules representing the probability with which the job is allocated
to the seller as a function of her reports, x1(m1), x2(m1,m2), and (iii) monetary transfers
from the buyer to the seller as a function of the seller’s reports, P1(m1), P2(m1,m2).
Denote by mt the history of messages sent by the seller up to period t. Thus, the
flow utility that the buyer and the seller get in period t when the report is mt, previous







0) denote P1(m1), x1(m1). Both players share a com-
mon discount factor δ = 1. By the revelation principle, we restrict attention to direct
mechanisms; i.e., mechanisms with M1 = M2 = [θ, θ].





2|θ1) = P2(θ′2, θ1)− x2(θ′2, θ1)θ2,
denote the expected payoff of a seller who reported cost θ1 in the first period, and who
has cost θ2 in the second period but reports cost θ
′
2. Define u(θ2|θ1) ≡ û(θ2, θ2|θ1) to be
the payoff of a seller who reports truthfully at period 2 and who reported θ1 at period











liability constraints, the buyer procures with probability 1 in both periods. Assumption 4 implies that
costs are positively serially correlated over time.
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denote the expected payoff of a seller who has cost θ1 in the first period but reports cost
θ′1, and who expects to report truthfully at period 2. Define U(θ1) ≡ Û(θ1, θ1) to be the
payoff of a seller who reports truthfully at period 1.
To satisfy incentive compatibility, the mechanism must be such that:3
∀θ1, θ′1 U(θ1) ≥ Û(θ1, θ′1), (1)
∀θ1, θ2, θ′2 u(θ2|θ1) ≥ û(θ2, θ′2|θ1). (2)
We restrict attention to mechanisms under which the seller earns positive flow payoffs
every period. Formally, we look for mechanisms that satisfy the following constraints:
∀θ1 P1(θ1)− x1(θ1)θ1 ≥ 0 (3)
∀θ1, θ2 P2(θ1, θ2)− x2(θ1, θ2)θ2 ≥ 0 (4)
These constraints are relevant when the seller does not have cash reserves and has no
access to credit markets.4 Note that any mechanism satisfying (3) and (4) satisfies
individual rationality for the seller; indeed, (3) and (4) imply that U1(θ) ≥ 0 for all
θ ∈ [θ, θ].
The problem of the buyer is to find the mechanism that maximizes her expected
payoffs, subject to incentive compatibility constraints and limited liability constraints.














(1), (2), (3) and (4)
Savings by the seller. An alternative way to model limited liabilities would be to
require that: (i) the seller’s payoff in period 1 be non-negative, and (ii) the seller’s total
payoff at the end of period 2 be non-negative. Formally, we could require (3) to hold
3Note that, if constraints (1) and (2) are satisfied, then it is optimal for the seller to report her type
truthfully at period 2 regardless of whether or not she misreported at period 2.
4Our main qualitative results continue to hold if we assume that the seller can suffer a per period
loss of at most −L with L < L for some L > 0.
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and substitute (4) with:
∀θ1, θ2 P1(θ1)− x1(θ1)θ1 + P2(θ1, θ2)− x2(θ1, θ2)θ2 ≥ 0 (6)
This formulation would be relevant if the seller can save resources in the first period
in order to relax the constraint in the second period. We note that our results would
continue to hold as stated under this weaker from of limited liability constraints. Indeed,
as our analysis shows, the second period limited liability constraint is not binding.
3 Results
Before presenting our results, it is useful to characterize the buyer’s optimal mechanism
in the benchmark case in which the mechanism need not satisfy constraints (3) and (4).
To guarantee that the seller is willing to participate, in this benchmark case we require
the mechanism to be individually rational:
∀θ1, U(θ1) ≥ 0. (7)
Proposition 0. Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then, a mechanism that maximizes (5)
subject to (1), (2) and (7) satisfies:
∀θ1 ∈ [θ, θ], xsb1 (θ1) = 1; P sb1 (θ1) = E[θ2|θ],
∀θ1, θ2 ∈ [θ, θ], xsb2 (θ1, θ2) = 1; P sb2 (θ1, θ2) = θ.
Under the optimal mechanism in Proposition 0, the buyer implements the optimal
allocation at time t = 2 and pays a transfer of θ, leaving the seller with significant
expected rents. At time t = 1, however, the buyer extracts the expected value of these
future rents by paying the seller a small amount E[θ2|θ] ∈ (θ, θ).5 As in Baron and
Besanko (1984) and Eső and Szentes (2017), under this optimal mechanism the seller
only gets rents for his private information at t = 1. Moreover, as emphasized by Eső
and Szentes (2017), the dynamic nature of the problem is “irrelevant.” Indeed, under
the optimal mechanism the buyer obtains the same expected profits she would obtain if
5We stress that the optimal mechanism is not unique: the timing of payments to the seller is not
uniquely pinned down by optimality.
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at the time of contracting she knew the seller’s “orthogonalized” private information at
time t = 2, but not the one at t = 1.
We now compare the optimal mechanism in Proposition 0 to the optimal mechanism
when limited liability constraints (3) and (4) must be satisfied. Define θ† ≡ E[θ2 | θ],






with initial condition ϑ(θ†) = θ. Note that dϑ(θ1)
dθ1
< 0, so ϑ(θ1) < θ for all θ1 > θ
†. We
extend ϑ to [θ, θ] by setting ϑ(θ) = θ for all θ < θ†. We have the following result.
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then, a mechanism that maximizes (5)
subject to (1), (2), (3) and (4) is given by:
∀θ1, x∗1(θ1) = 1; P ∗1 (θ1) =
θ1 if θ1 > θ† = E[θ2 | θ],E[θ2 | θ] if θ1 ≤ θ†.
∀θ1, θ2, x∗2(θ1, θ2) =
1 if θ2 ≤ ϑ(θ1),0 if θ2 > ϑ(θ1); P ∗2 (θ1, θ2) =
ϑ(θ1) if θ2 ≤ ϑ(θ1),0 if θ2 > ϑ(θ1).
The optimal mechanism described in Proposition 1 takes a simple structure. In the
first period, the allocation is the same as in Proposition 0. However, because of limited
liability constraints, the report the seller makes in period 1 now affects the payment she
receives at t = 1, as well as the payment and allocation in period 2. In particular, if the
period 1 report is above θ† = E[θ2|θ], the seller receives a transfer at t = 1 that exactly
covers her cost. Moreover, the seller procures at t = 2 if and only if her period 2 cost is
lower than ϑ(θ1) < θ.
We now provide an intuition for the solution in Proposition 1. Recall that, by
Proposition 0, in the absence of limited liability constraints, the transfer that the buyer
pays to a seller of type θ1 in period 1 is given by P
sb
1 (θ1) = E[θ2|θ] = θ†. When the seller’s
first period cost is below E[θ2|θ], the prices and allocations in Proposition 0 satisfy the
limited liability constraints (3) and (4), and hence are implementable. In contrast, when
the seller’s first period cost is larger than E[θ2|θ], the prices and allocations in Proposition
0 do not satisfy constraint (3). The optimal mechanism in this case maintains the period
1 allocation as in the benchmark case (x∗1(·) = xsb1 (·)), and sets the highest possible price
P ∗1 (θ1) = θ1 for all θ1 > E[θ2|θ]. To provide incentives for truthful reporting, the optimal
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mechanism adjusts the continuation payoff of the seller by changing the transfer she will
receive in the second period, and hence also the probability with which she procures in
the second period – this is the role of function ϑ(θ1).
Lastly, we explain why function ϑ(θ1) solves differential equation (8). Consider for
simplicity the case in which costs are independently distributed, with f2(θ2|θ1) = f2(θ2).





x∗1(θ̂)dθ̂ = θ − θ1 = P ∗1 (θ1)− x∗1(θ1)θ1 +
∫ θ
θ





where the first equality follows from incentive compatibility at t = 1 and the second
line follows from the optimal contract in Proposition 1. Differentiating both sides of (9)





We end this section with an example in which costs are iid and uniformly distributed.
Example 1. Suppose θ1 and θ2 are iid and uniformly distributed on interval [0, 1], so that
θ† = 1/2. In this case, the solution to differential equation (8) plus boundary condition
ϑ(θ†) = θ = 1 is ϑ(θ1) =
√
2(1− θ1) for all θ1 ∈ [1/2, 1]. The optimal allocation rule is
thus x∗1(θ1) = 1 for all θ1, and x
∗





This section highlights the key economic implications of the optimal mechanism in
Proposition 1.
Inefficiencies and payoffs. As Proposition 1 shows, limited liability constraints give
rise to new distortions: the probability that the seller procures in period 2 is lower than
in the benchmark case of Proposition 0. As a result, total surplus falls.
Who bears the cost of these new distortions? Because of the added constraints, the
buyer’s payoff must fall relative to the benchmark in Proposition 0. Whether or not the
seller’s payoff is lower under the solution in Proposition 1 depends on the correlation
structure of costs across periods. By the envelope formula (and using the fact that a
seller with cost θ earns zero expected payoff), under both mechanisms (i.e., the one in
Proposition 0 and the one in Proposition 1), the expected payoff of a seller with first
9























∂F (θ2 | θ̂)
∂θ̂
dθ2dθ̂ (10)
From equation (10), it follows that when costs are independent across periods, the seller
obtains the same expected payoff under the mechanism in Proposition 0 than under the
mechanism in Proposition 1: indeed, in this case ∂F (θ2|θ̂)
∂θ̂
= 0 and x∗1(θ1) = x
sb
1 (θ1) = 1
for all θ1. Therefore, when costs are independent the buyer bears all the cost of the
added distortions that limited liability constraints introduce.
Consider next the case in which costs are positively correlated, with ∂F (θ2|θ1)
∂θ1
≤ 0 for
all θ1, θ2, and recall from Propositions 0 and 1 that the allocation is less efficient in the
presence of limited liability constraints (i.e, xsb2 (θ1, θ2) ≥ x∗2(θ1, θ2) for all (θ1, θ2)). As a
result, the seller obtains a lower payoff under the mechanism in Proposition 1 relative
to her payoff under the mechanism in Proposition 0.
Dynamic relevance. Our analysis shows that, in the presence of limited liability
constraints, the dynamic irrelevance result in Eső and Szentes (2017) no longer holds.
This is true in spite of the fact that we we focus on a “regular” setting, namely a setting
in which the allocation obtained by maximizing virtual surplus is implementable.
To see why, suppose for simplicity that the seller’s costs are independently distributed
across periods.7 Consider, as Eső and Szentes (2017) do, a setting in which the buyer
can observe the seller’s second-period cost at the time of contracting.8 In this setting,
the buyer can implement the same allocation and obtain the same profits as in the
mechanism in Proposition 0, while satisfying incentive compatibility at t = 1 and limited
liability constraints (3) and (4). Indeed, this can be achieved by offering a mechanism
with x1(θ1) = x2(θ1, θ2) = 1 for all θ1, θ2, and with payments P1(θ1) = θ for all θ1, and
P2(θ1, θ2) = θ2 for all θ1, θ2. Note that the buyer obtains a strictly larger payoff under
this mechanism than under the mechanism in Proposition 1.
6See Appendix A for a derivation of equation (10).
7In Appendix B we show that the result in Eső and Szentes (2017) also fails to hold when costs are
positively correlated over time.
8Since costs are assumed to be independent across periods, this is equivalent to having the buyer
observing the seller’s orthogonalized second period cost.
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Path dependence. A notable feature of the mechanism in Proposition 1 is that it
exhibits path dependence: the probability that the seller procures in period 2 (condi-
tional on θ2) depends on her cost in the first period. Indeed, low reports in period 1 are
rewarded by increasing the posted price in period 2, hence expanding the set of reports
for which the job is procured. Note that this is true even when the firm’s costs are
independent over time.
The model therefore generates the prediction that buyers will give preferential treat-
ment to suppliers that had good past performance. This is consistent with procurement
practices of many firms. For instance, Toyota has been known for favoring suppliers that
performed well in the past (Roberts, 2007). Prior papers, like Board (2011), have shown
that these practices can be rationalized using relational incentives. Our arguments give
an alternative rationalization driven by limited liability constraints.
Appendix
A Proofs of Propositions 0 and 1
We start with a few preliminary observations. By performing standard manipulations of
incentive compatibility constraints (1) (or applying the envelope formula, Milgrom and
Segal (2002)), we obtain:

















Moreover, incentive compatibility constraints imply that the allocation x1(·) must be
monotone decreasing, while x2(θ1, ·) must be monotone decreasing for every θ1. We note
that in the special case in which θ2 is independent of θ1, the last term in (11) disappears
and we retrieve the usual envelope condition.
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Using the definitions of U(θ1) and u(θ2|θ1) as well as (11) and (12), we can rewrite
the payments functions as a function of the allocations:




































































f(θ2 | θ̂)dθ2 = 0
Moreover:∫ θ
θ














u(θ|θ1)f2(θ2 | θ1) + x2(θ1, θ2)F2(θ2 | θ1)
]
dθ2
Thus, from (13) and (14), we can write constraints (3) and (4) as:
∫ θ
θ1
x1(θ̂)dθ̂ + U(θ) ≥
∫ θ
θ













x2(θ1, θ̃)dθ̃ + u(θ|θ1) ≥ 0 (17)
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Now consider the objective function of the buyer. Substituting for (13), simplifying
the terms that depend on P2(θ1, θ2) and integrating by parts,
9 the buyer’s objective
function becomes:











(v − θ2)x(θ1, θ2)f2(θ2 | θ1)dθ2−












Proof of Proposition 0. To find the optimal mechanism in the absence of limited
liability constraints, we maximize (18) subject to the constraints that x1(·) is decreasing
and x2(θ1, ·) is decreasing for every θ1. By Assumptions 1-3, the solution to that problem
is to set xsb1 (θ1) = x
sb
2 (θ1, θ2) = 1 for all θ1, θ2 ∈ [θ, θ] and to set U(θ) = 0. Observe
that x2(·, ·) is monotone decreasing in both its argument and this is sufficient for the
incentive compatibility constraints in the original problem to hold (cf. Corollary 1 in
Pavan et al., 2014). Using (14) and u(θ|θ1) = 0, the second period transfer is given by
P sb(θ1, θ2) = θ. Lastly, using (13) and u(θ2|θ1) = P sb(θ1, θ2)− xsb2 (θ1, θ2)θ2 = θ− θ2, the
first period transfer is given by
P sb1 (θ1) = θ −
∫ θ
θ












(θ − θ2)f(θ2|θ1)dθ2 −
∫ θ
θ
(θ − θ2)(f(θ2|θ)− f(θ2|θ1))dθ2
= E[θ2|θ].
Finally, Assumption 4 implies that, with these transfers and allocation, IR constraint
(7) holds for all θ1 ∈ [θ, θ]. Indeed, for all θ1 ∈ [θ, θ],




= E[θ2|θ]− θ1 + θ − E[θ2|θ1] ≥ 0,





















where the last inequality follows since Assumption 4 implies that E[θ2|θ]− E[θ2|θ1] ≥ 0
for all θ1 ∈ [θ, θ]. 





Eθ1,θ2 [W ] (RP)
subject to (16), (17), x1(·) decreasing and x2(θ1, ·) decreasing for every θ1
Recall that we are assuming F1(θ)
f1(θ)
to be increasing in θ and that v is sufficiently high to
guarantee that v − θ − F1(θ)
f1(θ)
> 0. Thus the optimal allocation rule in the first period is
x1(θ1) = 1 for all θ1.
Consider limited liability constraint (16). Exploiting the fact that x1(θ1) = 1 for all
θ1, this constraint can be written as:
θ − θ1 ≥ −U(θ) + u(θ|θ1) +
∫ θ
θ










Notice that u(θ|θ1) enters on the right-hand side of (19) and does not enter on the
objective function. Thus, under an optimal mechanism, u(θ|θ1) = 0 for all θ1.10 Now set
x2(θ1, θ2) = 1 for all (θ1, θ2), which is the allocation that maximizes the principal’s payoff
in the absence of limited liability constraints (see Proposition 0). Then, the right-hand






















10Indeed, constraint (17) is still satisfied when we set u(θ|θ1) = 0.
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Thus, under this allocation, the right-hand side of (19) is constant in θ1. Instead the
left-hand side of (19) is decreasing in θ1. We conclude that there must exist θ
† ∈ [θ, θ]
such that (19) binds only if θ1 > θ
†.
For θ1 ≤ θ†, the optimal allocation rule is given by x∗1(θ1) = xsb1 (θ1) = 1 for all
θ1 and x
∗
2(θ1, θ2) = x
sb
2 (θ1, θ2) = 1 for all (θ1, θ2). For θ1 < θ
†, transfers are given by
P1(θ1) = E[θ2|θ] and P2(θ1, θ2) = θ for all θ2.
Thus, from now on, we will focus on the case in which θ1 > θ
†, so that (19) binds.
For each θ1, let λ(θ1) be the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (19). By
our discussion above, λ(θ1) = 0 for all θ ≤ θ†. Consider the Lagrangean of Program
(RP). Differentiating this Lagrangean with respect to x2(θ1, θ2), we get the following
first-order condition:










Following Jullien (2000), term
∫ θ1
θ
λ(θ̂)dθ̂ in the equation above corresponds to the
shadow value a uniform relaxation of the limited liability constraints (19) for all types
in the interval [θ, θ1].




λ(θ̂)dθ̂ (where we used the fact that λ(θ̂) = 0 for all θ̂ ≤ θ†). Note that this
derivative cannot be positive: if it was, it would be optimal to set U(θ) = +∞, which
can be satisfied only if at least one of the payments is set to +∞. Clearly, this cannot
be true at an optimal mechanism. It thus follows −1 +
∫ θ
θ†
λ(θ̂)dθ̂ ≤ 0, and so U(θ) = 0
is optimal.
Dividing (20) by f2(θ2 | θ1)f1(θ1) and rearranging, we get that the first-order condi-



















By the arguments above, we know that
∫ θ1
θ
λ(θ̂)dθ̂ ∈ [0, 1] for all θ1. It follows from
Assumptions 1-3 that, for each θ1 > θ
†, the first-order condition (20) is decreasing in θ2.
Moreover, first-order condition (20) is strictly positive at θ2 = θ.
11 For each θ1 ≥ θ†, let
11Indeed, at θ2 = θ, equation (21) is equal to
















= v − θ > 0,
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ϑ(θ1) be the value of θ2 at which the first-order condition (20) is equal to zero (if such a
θ2 does not exist, set ϑ(θ1) = θ). Therefore, for all θ1 > θ
†, the optimal allocation rule
in the second period is given by:
x∗2(θ1, θ2) =
1 if θ2 ≤ ϑ(θ1),0 if θ2 > ϑ(θ1).
Note that since λ(θ1) = 0 for all θ1 ≤ θ†, Assumption 3 implies that ϑ(θ†) = θ.
Substituting for this allocation rule in (19), and using the fact that this constraint
binds for all θ1 > θ
†, it follows that for all θ1 > θ
†
θ − θ1 =
∫ ϑ(θ1)
θ








where we used U(θ) = 0. Differentiating both sides of this equation with respect to θ1,





with boundary condition ϑ(θ†) = θ. Computing the equation above at θ1 = θ
† and using
ϑ(θ†) = θ yields
θ − θ† =
∫ θ
θ






















F2(θ2 | θ†)dθ2 +
∫ θ
θ







F2(θ2 | θ)dθ2 = θ − E[θ2 | θ], it follows that θ† = E[θ2 | θ].
Finally, it is immediate to verify that the allocation in the first period is monotone
decreasing and the allocation in the second period is monotone decreasing in both its
arguments. Hence, by Corollary 1 in Pavan et al. (2014), incentive compatibility con-
where the equality follows since F2(θ | θ1) = 0 and ∂F2(θ|θ1)∂θ1 = 0.
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straints (1) and (2) are satisfied. 
B Orthogonalized types and dynamic relevance
Following Eső and Szentes (2017), consider the following “orthogonalization” of the
seller’s private information. At time t = 1, the seller observes ε1 = F1(θ1). At time t = 2,
the seller observes ε2 = F2(θ2|θ1). Note that ε1 and ε2 are iid uniformly distributed on
[0, 1]. Moreover, this model is strategically equivalent to our original model in which the
seller observes θ1 and θ2 (provided that the seller remembers at time t = 2 the realization
of θ1). Indeed, θ1 = F
−1
1 (ε1) and θ2 = F
−1
2 (ε2|θ1).
Within this model, consider (as Eső and Szentes (2017) do) a benchmark setting in
which, at time t = 1, the buyer observes the realization of ε2, and can contract on this
information. Consider the following direct mechanism.
The allocation is x1(ε1) = x2(ε1, ε2) = 1 for all ε1, ε2; that is, the job is procured with
probability one in both periods independently of the reports. Note that this allocation
is equivalent to the one induced by the second best mechanism in Proposition 0.
Transfers are instead given by P1(ε1) = θ for all announced ε1 ∈ [0, 1]. For all
ε1, ε2 ∈ [0, 1]2, P2(ε1, ε2) = F−12 (ε2|θ). Note that transfer P2(ε1, ε2) is equal to what the
realized second period cost, θ2, would be given the orthogonalized type ε2 if the seller’s
first period cost was θ. Since ∂F2(θ2|θ1)/∂θ1 ≤ 0 for all θ1, θ2 ∈ [θ, θ] (Assumption 4), it
follows that P2(ε1, ε2) ≥ F−12 (ε2|θ1) = θ2; i.e., transfer P2(ε1, ε2) is weakly higher than the
seller’s second period cost. Hence, this mechanism satisfies limited liability constraints
(3) and (4).
Note that for all ε1 ∈ [0, 1], a seller with such orthogonalized type would have a
first-period cost equal to θ1 = F
−1
1 (ε1). His expected payoff would be given by
P1(ε1)− F−11 (ε1) + E[P2(ε1, ε2)− F−12 (ε2|θ1)] = θ − θ1 + E[θ2|θ]− E[θ2|θ1],
which is equal to what the seller gets under the mechanism in Proposition 0. Hence, this
mechanism also satisfies incentive compatibility at t = 1, and is thus implementable in
this benchmark environment in which the buyer observes the realization of ε2 at the time
of contracting. Furthermore, this contract gives the buyer the same expected payoff as
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